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ABSTRACT
In July 2015, China’s national legislature
brought in prosecutor-led civil environmental public
interest litigation (“EPIL”) for thirteen selected
provincial areas of the country. After a two-year legal
experiment, this prosecutor-led civil EPIL system was
then established nationwide in July 2017. Yet, can it be
said that prosecutorial regulators in China are in fact
a paper tiger? Drawing upon content analysis of the
655 prosecutor-led civil EPILs and in-depth interviews
with twelve frontline prosecutors and judges, this
article examines the dynamics of regulatory practice
and the motivation of the Chinese prosecutorial organs
to engage in environmental regulation through
litigation. Based upon the above two legislative
landmarks in the law reform of this area, the regulatory
practice of prosecutorial organs can be viewed as
having occurred in three stages, with each stage
featuring a distinct regulatory model: ad hoc
regulation through local innovation before July 2015,
forced regulation during the legal experiment from July
2015 to July 2017, and perfunctory regulation after the
nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil
EPIL system in July 2017. The data shows that the
Chinese prosecutorial organs have engaged in a larger
number of such lawsuits since the second stage, but
they have shown a strong preference for cases with less
complicated facts, weak and small defendants, and
minor environmental violations. Three factors that
influence regulatory motivation are employed to
analyse the change in regulatory models: the ambiguity
of the law, the top-down political pressure for
regulation, and the cost of regulation. This study
highlights the very limited effectiveness of vertical
political pressure in boosting prosecutorial regulation
and the strong impacts of the cost of regulation and the
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ambiguity of the law. In particular, the high cost of
regulation that takes weak regulatory capacity, lack of
regulatory autonomy, and the winning rate-oriented
performance appraisal system into account have
significantly weakened the motivation of prosecutorial
organs to pursue civil EPIL. The findings of this study
echo the conditions present in the successful
prosecutorial regulations in Brazil and contribute to
the scholarship about prosecutorial regulations in the
field of environmental protection in the Global South.
Keywords: prosecutor-led environmental public
interest litigation, prosecutorial regulation, regulatory
motivation, regulation through litigation, enforcement
of environmental law, china
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law enforcement by China’s Environmental
Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”) has been notoriously challenging.1 Faced
with severe environmental violations and such weak enforcement by
EPBs,2 China now needs new types of regulatory actors to step in to
help enforce environmental law, and both non-governmental
organizations and prosecutorial organs have taken on these roles in the
Chinese environmental regulatory landscape. This article focuses on
the prosecutorial regulators. The Chinese prosecutorial organs, called
“the people’s procuratorate” (renmin jianchayuan 人民检察院), serve
as prosecutors in criminal cases, representatives of the public interest
and legal supervisors. 3 Despite the public interests involved in
environmental litigation, in the past the role of the Chinese
* Chunyan Ding, Associate Professor, School of Law, City University of
Hong Kong.
** Huina Xiao, Assistant Professor, Faulty of Law, Macau University of
Science and Technology. Correspondence should be sent to hnxiao@must.edu.mo.
1
Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law
and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 367 (2013).
2
E.g., Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-hung Lo, Fragile
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial
Pollution Law, 32 L. POL'Y 14, 15 (2010); Genia Kostka, Command Without
Control: The Case of China’s Environmental Target System, 10 REG.
GOVERNANCE 58, 58 (2016); Benjamin van Rooij, REGULATING LAND AND
POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT: THEORY
AND CASES 227-352 (2006); Benjamin Van Rooij, Rachel E. Stern & Kathinka
Fürst, The Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Understanding China’s
New Environmental Actors, 10 REG. GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (2016).
3
Mingde Cao & Fengyuan Wang, Environmental Public Interest
Litigation in China, 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 217, 222 (2011).
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prosecutorial organs in environmental litigation was marginal and
sporadic. However, on July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (quanguo renda changweihui 全国人大
常 委 会 ), China’s national legislature, empowered the people’s
procuratorates to file environmental public interest litigation (huanjing
gongyi susong 环境公益诉讼, “EPIL”) against polluters in thirteen
selected provincial areas. This regulatory innovation aimed to
diversify the types of regulators and mechanisms there were to combat
growing environmental violations. 4 After a two-year experiment in
legal reform with these prosecutor-led EPILs,5 the national legislature
amended the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
(“Civil Procedure Law”)6 on June 27, 2017 to establish the role of
prosecutorial organs in filing EPIL and legalize prosecutorial public
interest litigation nationwide.
Before this legal reform, it was widely doubted in the literature
whether Chinese prosecutorial organs could become a strong enough
regulatory force to deter environmental violations. For instance,
drawing on 24 prosecutorial civil litigation cases up to March 2013,
and in-depth interviews with 16 prosecutors, Shi and van Rooij find
that prosecutorial regulation in China is unlikely to develop into a new
enforcement tool due to the lack of capacity and independence as well
as the preference for criminal work.7 As Cao and Wang suggest, “[the]
nature and content of environmental public interest litigation are
inconsistent with the nature of the procuratorate and its power”.8 Liu
also doubts whether prosecutorial organs have sufficient resources to
devote to civil enforcement because they have been fully loaded with
criminal prosecutions. 9 Given the dependence of Chinese
4

Yifan Shi & Benjamin van Rooij, Prosecutorial Regulation in the Global
South: Environmental Civil Litigation by Prosecutors in China compared to Brazil,
10 REG. GOVERNANCE. 44, 44 (2016).
5
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, PLAN FOR THE PILOT REFORM SCHEME
OF INITIATING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS BY THE PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES,
(Promulgated on Jul. 2, 2015). See also Rooij, Stern, & Fürst, supra note 2.
6
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (hereinafter CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW) (Promulgated on Apr. 9, 1991, Amended on Oct. 28, 2007, on
Aug. 31, 2012 and on Jun. 27, 2017).
7
Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4.
8
Cao & Wang, supra note 3, at 222.
9
Jingjing Liu, China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil
Enforcement: Practice, Challenges & Implications for China’s Environmental
Governance, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 66–67 (2011).
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prosecutorial organs on local government at the same administrative
level, some also argue that the procuratorate’s environmental civil
enforcement actions may still be subject to local interference. 10 A
common concern is the legal ambiguity about the procuratorate’s
standing and the procedural rules of EPIL.11
Little literature has examined the performance of the Chinese
prosecutorial organs in mobilizing EPIL and the factors that influence
their performance since the national legislature approved prosecutorled EPIL in July 2015. Do prosecutorial regulators remain a “paper
tiger” even now that they have been granted standing to sue
environmental polluters? How have those factors that have influenced
regulatory motivation changed over time? How can the Chinese
experience contribute to the discourse on prosecutorial regulation in
the Global South? This article aims to update and deepen the
understanding of the practice of prosecutor-led EPIL and the
regulatory motivation of the Chinese prosecutorial organs over three
stages: local innovation before the legal reform of July 2015;
experimental legal reform from July 2015 to July 2017; and
nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil EPIL system after
July 2017. Drawing on content analysis of 655 prosecutor-led civil
EPILs up to December 2018, and in-depth interviews with 12 frontline
prosecutors and judges from Beijing (north area of China), Shann’xi
Province (northwest area of China), Fujian Province (southeast area of
China), Guangdong Province (south area of China), Guangxi Zhuang
Minority Autonomous Region (south area of China), and Guizhou
Province (southwest area of China), as well as official statistical
documents, this article finds that the Chinese prosecutorial organs’
practice and regulatory motivation to engage in civil EPIL has changed
through three distinct regulatory models: from ad hoc regulation,
through forced regulation, to perfunctory regulation. It also finds that
although prosecutorial regulators have filed more and more
environmental civil lawsuits against environmental polluters
throughout the three stages, they have demonstrated a stronger
preference for handling cases with less complicated facts, minor

10

Christine J. Lee, "Pollute First, Control Later" No More: Combating
Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public
Interest Litigation and Public Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. POL'Y J. ASS'N. 795,
805–806 (2008); Liu, supra note 9.
11
See, e.g., Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4, at 47; Cao & Wang, supra note
3, at 222, 230; Liu, supra note 9, at 57.
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environmental pollution, weak and small defendants, and a small
number of monetary claims.
In this study, we employ three factors that may influence
regulatory motivation to explain the change of the Chinese
prosecutorial organs’ practice on civil EPILs from 2003 to 2018:
ambiguity of the law (legal factor), top-down political pressure for
regulation (political factor), and organizational cost of regulation
(organizational factor). We find that the vertical political pressure has
relatively limited effectiveness, and the organizational cost of
regulation concerning capacity and autonomy for regulation as well as
the winning rate-oriented performance appraisal system plays a critical
role in shaping prosecutorial regulation in China, echoing the Brazilian
experiences of prosecutorial regulation. The study further gains
insights on the dynamics of the regulatory motivations that influence
the regulatory performance of prosecutorial organs in the Global South.
The article unfolds as follows. It first takes a brief look at
China’s procuratorate system as well as its roles in environmental
protection. The following part presents the empirical data collected on
the prosecutor-led civil EPILs from 2003 to 2018 and the regulatory
changes throughout the three stages noted above. It then analyzes how
the underlying political, legal and organizational factors have changed
and influenced the regulatory motivation, leading to the different
models of prosecutorial regulations in the three stages. The final part
concludes with the implications of this study and the suggestions for
enhancing prosecutorial regulation in China.
I.

CHINA’S PROCURATORATE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

In China, the people’s procuratorates, as the State organs of
legal supervision, exercise prosecutorial power to prosecute criminals
and safeguard state security and social order, to protect the lawful
rights and interests of individuals and organizations and the national
interest and public interests, to guarantee the correct implementation
of laws, to safeguard fairness and justice and protect the unity, dignity
and authority of the legal system, as well as to ensure the smooth
progress of construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.12
12

National People’s Congress, ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
PROCURATORATES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (hereinafter ORGANIC
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The procuratorate’s functions are therefore not confined to criminal
investigations and prosecutions, and also include supervision over the
police, prisons, and courts to ensure that their activities conform to the
law. 13 In other words, the Chinese prosecutorial organs mainly
undertake four types of work: criminal investigation and prosecution;
supervision over criminal enforcement activities; supervision over
civil and administrative litigations; and filing and participating in
public interest litigations.14
In practice, however, prosecutorial organs devote most of their
efforts to criminal prosecutions.15 For instance, out of ten procuratorial
offices (ting 厅) in the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), five
offices deal with various criminal investigations and prosecutions,16
three offices deal with legal supervision of criminal enforcement
activities17 and civil and administrative litigations,18 one office deals
with public interest litigations,19 and one office deals with complaints,
state compensation and judicial assistance.20 It is noteworthy that at
one point anti-corruption had been the most important work of the
Chinese prosecutorial organs. However, its power of criminal
investigation and prosecution has significantly decreased after the anticorruption office was removed from the organization and a new State
organ called “the Supervision Committee” (jiancha weiyuanhui 监察
委员会) was established in 2018 to take over the prosecutorial organs’

LAW OF PROCURATORATES) (Promulgated on Jul. 5, 1979, Amended on Sept. 2,
1983, on Dec. 2, 1986 and on Oct. 26, 2018), art. 2.
13
Liu, supra note 9, at 47.
14
ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES , art. 20, supra note 12.
15
Liu, supra note 9, at 67.
16
See SPP, Internal Institutions of the SPP,
http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gjyjg/nsjg/index.shtml. Among these five offices that
deals with criminal investigations and prosecutions, the First Office is in charge of
the criminal prosecutions other than the prosecutions initiated by the Second,
Third, and Fourth Offices; the Second Office deals with crimes of endangering
national security, crimes of endangering public security, intentional homicide,
robbery, drugs-related crime, etc.; the Third Office charges crimes of
embezzlement and bribery, crimes of dereliction of duty, and crimes of
servicemen’s transgression of duties; the Fourth Office is responsible for the
prosecution of crimes of disrupting the order of the socialist market economy; and
the Ninth Office deals with minor crimes prosecutions.
17
Id. (The fifth Office).
18
Id. (The sixth and seventh Offices).
19
Id. (The eighth Office).
20
Id. (The tenth Office).
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authority and functions regarding anti-corruption. 21 Since then, the
SPP has promoted “Four Major Procuratorships” (sida jiancha 四大
检 察 ) over criminal, civil, administrative and public interest
litigations.22 This new development reveals a trend towards balancing
the different types of prosecutorial work in China’s procuratorate
system rather than keeping to its original focus on criminal work.
As Article 138 of the Constitutional Law of the People’s
Republic of China23 stipulates, “the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is
responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee. The people’s procuratorates at various levels are
responsible to the organs of State power which created them, and to
the people’s procuratorates at higher levels.” The Chinese
prosecutorial organs are under the dual leadership: a vertical leadership
of the superior procuratorates and a horizontal leadership of the local
people’s congress (“LPC”) at the same level.24 The SPP is the national
and highest prosecutorial organ and directs the work of the local
people’s procuratorates at provincial, municipal and county levels as
well as the work of the special people’s procuratorates (Figure 1). The
veridical leadership of the superior procuratorates, however, is
confined to prosecutorial work only. Specifically, the upper-level
procuratorates can direct the lower-level procuratorates to correct,
rescind or revise the latter’s decisions if they believe such decisions
are wrong. They can also designate jurisdiction to the lower-level
procuratorates or handle the cases which are under the jurisdiction of
the lower-level procuratorates, and call up on a centralized basis the
prosecutors within their jurisdiction to handle cases.25
21

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, REFORM
PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE PARTY AND NATIIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(Promulgated on Mar. 21, 2018).
22
To Provide Theoretical Support for the Comprehensive Development of
the "Four Major Procuratorships" (Wei sidajiancha quanmian xietiao chongfen
fazhan tigong lilun zhicheng), PROCURATORIAL DAILY (JIANCHA RIBAO) (Feb. 18,
2019), http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/201902/t20190218_408223.shtml.
23
National People’s Congress, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Promulgated on Dec. 4, 1982, Amended on Apr. 12, 1988, on
Mar. 29, 1993, on Mar. 15, 1999, on Mar. 14, 004, and on Mar. 11, 2018), art. 138.
24
Zhanhong Hao, Analysis about the Working & Leading Relationship
between Higher & Lower People’s Procuratorates (Shangxiaji renmin jianchayuan
gongzuo lingdao guanxi xintan), 8 L. REV. (FAXUE ZAZHI) 114–117 (2009); Guiwu
Wang, WANG GUIWU’S STUDY ON PROCURATORATE (WANG GUIWU LUN JIANCHA)
46 (2008).
25
ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES , art. 24, supra note 12.
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In terms of the horizontal leadership, the LPC and its standing
committee horizontally control the appointments and budgets of the
procuratorate at the same level.26 For example, the chief procurators at
various levels are elected and removed by the LPC at the same level,
and the deputy chief procurators, members of prosecutorial
committees and individual procurators are appointed and removed by
the standing committee of the LPC at the same level. 27 The LPC,
however, is integrated with the local party committee of the
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) and subject to the CPC.28 Indeed,
“[i]n many jurisdictions, the chairman of the standing committee of the
local people’s congress now concurrently serves as chairman or vicechairman of the party committee at the corresponding level”. 29 The
dependence of the local prosecutorial organs on the LPC and the local
party committee is clear and significant.30 In 2015, in order to avoid
local interference with prosecutorial work, local prosecutorial organs
underwent an institutional reform aimed at bringing about the
centralized management of personnel, financial and material resources
of the procuratorates below the provincial level. 31 However, this
reform only centralized the management of financial and material
resources while personnel matters remain controlled by the LPC and
the local party committee.32

26

Hao, supra note 24.
ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES, art. 38, supra note 12.
28
Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing
Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative
Harmony, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 139, 157 (2013).
29
Id. at 208.
30
Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4.
31
Kai Xu, Focusing on the Institutional Reform on the Centralized
Management of Personnel, Financial and Material Resources of Local Courts
Below Provincial Level (Jujiao sheng yixia fayuan jianchayuan ren cai wu
tongguan zhidu gaige), PROCURATORATE DAILY (JIANCHA RIBAO) (Jul. 27, 2015)
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/201507/t20150727_102052.shtml.
32
Liang Zhang, The Constitutional Perspective of Design and Reform of
the Provincial Governing and Cross-Administrative-Division Court and
Procuratorate System (Shengtongguan ji kua xingzheng quhua fayuan, jianchayuan
shezhi gaige zhi xianfa shijiao), 23.1 J. CENT. SOUTH UNIV. SOC. SCI. (ZHONGNAN
DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)) 41, 42 (2017); Qicai Gao, The Legal
Obstacles in Unified Management of Staff Members and Properties of Courts and
Procuratorates blow the Provincial Level (Shengyixia difang fayuan, jianchayuan
rencaiwu tongyi guanli gaige de falü zhang'ai), 1 J. SUZHOU UNIV. (SUZHOU
DAXUE XUEBAO) 11, 15 (2014).
27
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In the environmental protection arena, prosecutorial organs are
responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes as
well as supervising the work of EPBs and public security authorities
with respect to environmental crimes.33 The SPP’s 2018 Work Report
submitted to the National People’s Congress stated that prosecutorial
organs cracked down on crimes related to damaging the environment
and national resources and that they had prosecuted 137,000 persons
in the last five years (amounting to an increase of 59.3 percent over
five years) for air, water and land pollution, the importation of “foreign
garbage”, the illegal occupation of cultivated land, illegal mining,
illegal logging, and the like.34
In addition, prosecutorial organs protect the environment through
non-criminal approaches. First, prosecutorial organs have the power to
protest (kangsu 抗诉), in accordance with the procedure of judicial
supervision, illegal or incorrect rulings and judgments on civil and
administrative environmental cases that are made by the lower-level
courts 35 and request the same-level courts to conduct a retrial. 36
Second, prosecutorial organs can advise relevant public organs in
charge of the implementation of environmental law (in particular, the
EPBs) in order to effectively implement laws and regulations and
reduce environmental violations and crimes. 37 Third, prosecutorial
organs can support private environmental litigations as well as EPILs

33

Liu, supra note 9.
Jianming Cao, Work Report of the Supreme People's Procuratorate at
the First Meeting of the 13th National People's Congress (Zuigao renmin
Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao, disanjie quanguo renmin daibaio dahui disanci
huiyi)XINHUA NET (XINHUA WANG) (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gzbg/201803/t20180325_372171.shtml.
35
Authors’ Note (The people’s procuratorate, as the State’s legal
supervisor, exercises a power to protest to the same-level court rulings and
judgments on civil and administrative cases as well as criminal cases that are made
by the lower-level courts and that it deems violating procedural and substantive
justice.). See Fan Yu, The Functions of Judicial Supervision and the Design for Its
System (Part One) (Sifa jiandu de gongneng ji zhidu sheji (shang)], 5 JUSTICE OF
CHINA (ZHONGGUO SIFA) 22, 22 (2004).
36
CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 208, supra note 6; Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW)
(Promulgated on Apr. 4, 1989, Amended on Nov. 1, 2014 and on Jun. 27, 2017),
art. 93.
37
SPP, PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE PROVISIONS ON PROCURATORIAL
SUGGESTIONS WORK (Promulgated on Feb. 26, 2019), art. 10.
34
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filed by other state agencies or non-governmental organizations. 38
Fourth, prosecutorial organs can supervise and put pressure on relevant
supervising agencies and state-owned units to fulfil their supervisory
responsibilities and bring civil litigations if they fail or are slow in
doing so.39 Last but not least, prosecutorial organs have been recently
granted authority to file civil and administrative EPILs. Out of all these
non-criminal approaches that prosecutorial organs deploy in
environmental protection, this article focuses on prosecutor-led civil
EPILs.
Figure 1. Organizational Chart of the Chinese Prosecutorial Organs40

II.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE THREE STAGES OF PROSECUTORLED CIVIL EPILS

Before July 2015, only a few of the local prosecutorial organs
were engaged in the legal innovation of suing polluters through civil
litigation, which is categorized here as the first stage of prosecutor-led
civil EPILs. The national legislature then launched a two-year
38

CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 55, supra note 6.
Liu, supra note 9, at 54–55.
40
See ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES, art. 12, 13, supra note 12.
39
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experimental legal reform of prosecutor-led EPIL in July 2015, which
is categorized as the second stage. In July 2017, the prosecutor-led
EPIL system was formally established and implemented nationwide,
which is categorized as the third stage in this article.41 Because a civil
case tried in the way of ordinary procedure 42 is required to be
concluded within six months from the date of placing the case on file,
according to Article 149 of the Civil Procedure Law, we divided the
judicial decisions of prosecutor-led civil EPILs into three categories:
(1) cases adjudicated before 2015 (inclusive) (i.e., cases filed before
July 2015); (2) cases adjudicated in 2016 and 2017 (i.e., cases filed
from July 2015 to July 2017); and (3) cases adjudicated after 2018
(inclusive) (i.e., cases filed after July 2017). Each category was used
to investigate the practice of prosecutorial organs in the corresponding
stage. This part first presents an overview of the empirical data on
judicial decisions of prosecutor-led civil EPILs across the country
made between 2003 and 2018. A descriptive analysis of empirical data
that demonstrates the changing practice of prosecutorial organs over
the three stages of prosecutor-led civil EPILs will then follow.
A. A Bird’s Eye View
Our dataset contains 655 cases of prosecutor-led civil EPILs
adjudicated from 2003 up to December 31, 2018. The cases
adjudicated before 2014 were collected from the SPP’s official

41

Authors’ Note (The experiment started on July 1, 2015 and ended on
June 30, 2017. There were only two cases adjudicated before July 1, 2015. We thus
counted these two cases of 2015 in the first stage. The prosecutor-led EPIL system
was legislated in July 2017. The majority of cases adjudicated after July 2017,
however, were initiated by the prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas before July
2017. Therefore we counted the cases adjudicated in 2017 in the second stage. The
third stage covers the cases that were filed after July 2017.).
42
Id. (Civil lawsuits are in principle tried in the way of ordinary procedure
(putong chengxu 普通程序) while simple lawsuits may be tried in the way of easy
procedure (jianyi chengxu 简易程序). See CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, Art. 157, supra
note 6. Prosecutor-led civil EPILs (except those civil EPILs incidental to criminal
litigation) collected in our database were all tried in the way of ordinary
procedure.).
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publications, 43 online resources 44 and research articles, 45 while the
cases adjudicated from 2014 to 2018 were collected from the Supreme
People’s Court’s official online database called “China Adjudication
Decisions Online”.46 In our dataset, there are only 31 prosecutor-led
civil EPILs adjudicated before 2016, but the case number mushrooms
from two cases in 2015, to 11 cases in 2016, 64 cases in 2017, and then
to 549 cases in 2018 (Figure 2). Although, due to the delayed upload
of adjudication decisions by the courts, the dataset only includes 53.77
percent of the total number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs (1,021 cases)
in 2018, 47 nevertheless it is a robust sample to reveal the general
characteristics of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in China. We coded a
number of key variables, including the geographical location of the
cases, the level of the court, the level of the trial, the date of the trial,
43
Civil and Administrative Prosecutorial Office of the SPP (hereinafter
CAPO), THE PRACTICE AND EXPLORATION OF PROSECUTORIAL ORGANS-INITIATED
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS (JIANCHA JIGUAN TIQI GONGYI SUSONG SHIJIAN YU
TANSUO) 33–45 (2017).
44
See, e.g., PKU Law, pkulaw.cn; see also China Courts’ Website,
chinacourt.org.
45
Xudong Zhang & Jingjie Lin, Expansion and Restriction: The Path for
the Plaintiff Qualification Selection in China’s Environmental Civil Public Interest
Litigation, 5 CHINA LEG. SCI. 133, 136 (2017); Zhi Bie & Tao Bie, Overview of the
Development of Environmental Public Interest Litigations (Huanjing gongyi
susong jinzhan gaishu), 412.1 B ENVTL. PROT. (HUANJING BAOHU] 23, 23–25
(2009); Bojin Tao, On the Practice of the Prosecutorial organ Participating in
Environmental Public Suits (Jiancha jiguan canyu huanjing minshi gongyi susong
de shijian jinlu), 39.4 J. XINJIANG UNIV. (PHILOSOPHY, HUMANIT. SOC. SCI.)
(XINJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)) 34, 34–45,
(2011).
46
Authors’ Note (According to the Provisions of the SPC on Online
Publication of Judgments by the People’s Courts (promulgated on Nov. 21, 2013),
since January 1, 2014, all Chinese courts have been required to upload adjudication
decisions to this online database except those cases involving state secrets, business
secrets, privacy issues, and adolescent criminals. Therefore, China Adjudication
Decision Online (zhongguo caipan wenshu wang 中国裁判文书网) has started
releasing adjudication decisions from January 1, 2014.). See Global Legal Monitor,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-rulesof-online-publication-of-court-judgments-revised/; see also Home page, CHINA
JUDGEMENTS ONLINE, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn (Although Chinese courts are
used to docket the same case involving multiple defendants as separate cases, we
combine such cases into one case.).
47
SPC, The News Conference for “Chinese Environmental and Resources
Cases Trial 2017-2018”, “Report of the Chinese Environmental Judicial
Development 2017-2018”, and Typical Cases of Ecological and Environmental
Protection, CHINACOURT.ORG (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.chinacourt.org/chat/fulltext/listId/51171/template/courtfbh20190302.s
html.
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the name and location of the prosecutorial plaintiff, the type of
prosecutor-led civil EPILs, the type of defendant, the type of
environmental violation, the type and amount of claims, and the result
of the cases.
Figure 2. Case Number of Prosecutor-led Civil EPILs from 2003 to 2018

Source: Author

In terms of the type of adjudication decisions, out of 655 cases
of prosecutor-led civil EPILs, 48 are verdicts dealing with procedural
issues (7.33 percent), 592 are judgments dealing with substantive
issues (90.38 percent), 14 are mediation decisions (2.14 percent) and
one case (0.15 percent) is unknown. In terms of the level of the court,
568 cases (86.72 percent) were tried by the district court, 79 cases by
the appellate court (12.06 percent), and 8 cases by the high court (1.22
percent). Out of all the cases, only 24 are appeal cases (3.66 percent).
In terms of the type of prosecutor-led civil EPILs, 655 cases can be
divided into two categories: 562 cases (85.8 percent) are “civil
litigation incidental to criminal litigation” (xingshi fudai mingshi
susong, 刑 事 附 带 民 事 诉 讼 ,“incidental civil litigation”), through
which civil claims against polluters are handled by the same collegial
panel of environmental criminal litigation, and 93 cases (14.2 percent)
are ordinary civil litigations (Table 1).

2021] A PAPER TIGER? PROSECUTORIAL REGULATIONS IN CHINA 337
Table 1. Basic Information of Prosecutor-led Civil EPILs

Source: Author

In terms of the geographical location of the cases, all provincial
areas of the country have at least one prosecutor-led civil EPIL case
except Hainan Province and the City of Tianjin (one of the four
“municipalities directly under the Central Government”, zhixiashi, 直
辖 市 ). Zhejiang Province has 66 cases, the highest among all
provincial places, followed by Hunan Province (55 cases), Jiangsu
Province and Sichuan Province (51 cases), Hubei Province (47 cases),
Anhui Province (46 cases), Jiangxi Province (40 cases), Yunnan
Province (38 cases), Guangdong Province (36 cases), and Jilin
Province (34 cases) (Figure 3). However, the data do not reveal a clear
relation between the geographical distribution of the cases and the
economic development of the areas. The number of cases in rich,
middle-income and poor areas is 164 (25.04 percent), 107 (16.34
percent) and 384 (45.63 percent) respectively.48
48
See China Statistical Yearbook 2018, NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF
CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm (For provincial per
capita GDP rank.); see also Rich Province, Poor Province, THE ECONOMIST (Oct.
1, 2016), https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/01/rich-province-poorprovince (For the criteria of poor, middle-income, and poor areas. Rich provinces
include Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. The
middle-income provinces include Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Jilin,
Chongqing, and Shannxi. The poor provinces include Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shanxi,
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Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of Prosecutor-led Civil EPILs

Notes: Bold emphasises added for the top 10 provinces.
Source: Author

In terms of the type of prosecutorial plaintiff, 601 (91.76
percent) are the prosecutorial organs at the district or county level and
54 (8.24 percent) are the municipal-level prosecutorial organs. Out of
633 cases with valid information, the defendants or environmental
violators in 544 cases (85.93 percent) are individuals, those in 36 cases
(5.69 percent) are companies, and those in 53 cases (8.37 percent)
include both individuals and companies.
Regarding the type of environmental violation, the majority of
the cases (69.60 percent) involve ecological destruction (such as illegal
mining, logging, fishing, and occupation of cultivated land). Cases of
water pollution and those of soil pollution account for 16.34 percent
and 8.81 percent respectively. Air pollution (2.84 percent) and noise
pollution cases (0.28 percent) are the least (Figure 4).

Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Gansu,
Qinghai, Xinjiang, Hubei, Ningxia, and Tibet.).
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Figure 4. Types of Environmental Violations

Notes: The number of types may exceed the number of cases because one case may
have more than one type of environmental violation.
Source: Author

In terms of the type of claims, the data show that in 344 cases
(52.52 percent) the prosecutorial plaintiffs claimed an injunction, in 84
cases (12.82 percent) an apology, and in 477 cases (72.82 percent) a
monetary remedy. The amount of monetary claims in prosecutor-led
civil EPILs was relatively small. In the dataset, monetary claims in
63.64 percent of 473 cases with valid information were less than RMB
100,000; 27.06 percent of them ranged from RMB 100,000 to 1 million;
and 9.31 percent of them exceeded RMB 1 million (Table 2).
Regarding the court’s award, monetary claims in 80.13 percent of 473
cases with valid information were fully supported, those in 8.25
percent of the cases were supported more than half, those in 3.81
percent of the cases were supported less than half, and only those in
5.50 percent of the cases were totally rejected. In 2.33 percent of the
cases courts provided other remedies (order or injunction) in lieu of
damages (Table 2). Out of 340 cases that claimed an injunction, 281
(82.65 percent) were upheld, 59 (17.35 per cent) were rejected, and
courts in 15 cases (4.41 percent) awarded monetary compensation in
lieu of an injunction. Except the cases disputing jurisdiction issues,
courts awarded at least one type of remedy (injunction, apology and
monetary remedy). In other words, the overall winning rate of the
prosecutorial plaintiff was 100 percent.
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Table 2. The Amount of Monetary Claims and the Award Rate

Source: Author

B. The Changing Practice of Prosecutor-led Civil EPILs over
the Three Stages
This section provides a descriptive analysis of empirical data
in each stage of prosecutorial regulation, which shows that the
performance of the Chinese prosecutorial organs in engaging in civil
EPILs has varied significantly in four aspects over the three stages.
The first aspect is concerned with the type of prosecutor-led civil
EPILs. Although the number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in the third
stage increased by more than six times compared with the second stage,
the percentage of ordinary civil litigations of EPIL slipped to 7.29
percent, the lowest among the three stages, while the percentage of
incidental civil litigations of EPIL rocketed to 92.71 percent, the
highest in the three stages (Figure 5). This contrast shows that the
prosecutorial organs are inclined to get clues to civil EPIL cases when
they are investigating and prosecuting environmental criminal cases.
Such an approach helps them to significantly reduce litigation costs in
two major ways: first, the facts and evidence of environmental
violations involved in criminal cases can be re-used for the purpose of
pursuing civil EPILs; and second, civil proceedings of an incidental
civil litigation can be simplified and merged into criminal proceedings,
which is within the “comfort zone” of prosecutors. In contrast, in
ordinary civil litigations of EPIL, prosecutorial organs take far more
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time and effort to investigate the case facts and collect evidence, and
then participate in longer and more complicated civil proceedings.
Figure 5. Changes of Litigation Type over the Three Stages

Source: Author

The second aspect is concerned with the type of defendant in
prosecutor-led civil EPILs. The data show that prosecutorial organs
are more willing to choose individual defendants over corporate ones.
The percentage of cases involving individual defendants increased
from 61.29 percent in the first stage, to 66.67 percent in the second
stage, and then to 91.20 percent in the third stage, increasing by 29.91
percent overall (Figure 6). However, the percentage of cases involving
corporate defendants dropped from 38.71 percent in the first stage, to
33.33 percent in the second stage, and then further to 8.8 percent in the
third stage (Figure 6). Therefore, the prosecutorial organs are clearly
inclined to sue weak and small defendants in civil EPILs, and
moreover they demonstrated a growing inclination to do this
throughout all the three stages.
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Figure 6. Changes of Defendant Type over the Three Stages
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The third aspect of the changing practice of prosecutor-led civil
EPILs concerns the type of environmental pollution involved in the
cases. As mentioned above, ecological destruction cases are the most
common type of environmental violation that gives rise to prosecutorled civil EPILs. The data show that there were eight ecological
destruction cases in the first stage. The number increased to 41 in the
second stage and then rocketed to 441 in the third stage (Figure 7). The
percentage of ecological destruction cases increased greatly from
21.62 percent in the first stage, to 53.25 percent in the second stage,
and then further to 76.70 percent in the third stage. In contrast, the
percentage of water, air and noise pollution cases significantly
declined. The exception was soil pollution cases, whose percentage at
first increased from 8.11 percent in the first stage to 16.88 percent in
the second stage, but later dropped back to 8 percent in the third stage
(Figure 8). Compared with other types of environmental violation,
ecological destruction cases are much easier and cheaper for
prosecutorial organs to handle in terms of case selection, fact-finding
and evidence collection. Moreover, many of the ecological destruction
cases were initiated in the manner of civil litigation incidental to
criminal prosecution for ecological destruction, as analysed above,
which saved substantially litigation costs on the part of prosecutorial
organs. This explains why prosecutorial organs demonstrated a
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stronger preference for ecological destruction cases in pursuing civil
EPILs throughout all the three stages.
Figure 7. Changes in the Number of Different Environmental Violations
over the Three Stages
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Figure 8. Changes in the Percentage of Different Environmental Violations
over the Three Stages
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The fourth aspect of the changing practice of prosecutor-led
civil EPILs concerns the amounts of monetary claims involved in civil
EPILs. The data reveal that the overall amounts of monetary claims
involved in prosecutor-led civil EPILs shrank over the three stages.
Although the absolute value of the case number in each range of claim
amounts grew (Figure 9), the percentage of cases with a smaller
amount of monetary claims (less than RMB 10,000 and between RMB
10,001 and RMB 100,000) significantly increased, while the
percentage of cases with a larger amount of monetary claims (more
than RMB 100,000) decreased (Figure 10). A temporary small increase
in the percentage of cases with the amount of monetary claim between
RMB 500,000 and RMB 1,000,000 and over RMB 10 million in the
second stage did not change the overall trend in this regard.
Figure 9. Changes in the Amount of Monetary Claims over the Three
Stages
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Figure 10. Changes in the Percentage of Different Categories of Monetary
Claims over the Three Stages
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To sum up, it is possible to descriptively characterize the trend
of prosecutor-led civil EPILs against environmental polluters over the
three stages as follows: although the case number is increasing,
prosecutorial organs tend to choose less complicated cases involving
minor environment pollution against individual but not corporate
defendants, and seek monetary claims of a smaller amount. In
particular, in the first stage (before July 2015), despite a small number
of cases, prosecutorial organs preferred high-profile cases with more
complicated facts, corporate defendants, serious environmental
pollution and larger monetary claims. However, from the second stage
(from July 2015 to July 2017) on, despite a growing number of
prosecutor-led civil EPILs, prosecutorial organs have been more
willing to choose less complicated cases with lower monetary claims
against individual defendants and minor environmental pollution. Why
have prosecutorial organs changed their preference in terms of case
selection when pursuing civil EPILs? How has their regulatory
motivation changed over time? The next part endeavours to answer
these questions.
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III.

EXPLAINING REGULATORY MOTIVATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL
ORGANS

Regulators are motivated by various factors. To study the
regulatory motivation of prosecutorial organs, three categories of
factors are employed: legal, political and organizational. The legal
factor concerns whether the law has provided legal enforcers (e.g.,
courts, procuratorates, and the police) with a legal basis and procedural
rules for regulation. The political factor concerns the top-down
political pressure to implement national policies and strengthen
regulation. The organizational factor refers to the calculations of the
cost of regulation, which is concerned with regulatory capacity and
autonomy as well as the performance appraisal mechanism applied to
regulators.
In terms of the first factor, the presence of legal standing and
procedural rules for regulation is critical for regulators to legalize and
guide their regulatory acts. The law also establishes the accountability
of regulators (including who is accountable, whom to account to, and
what to account for).49 The certainty of law reduces the legal risk of
regulation. The ambiguity of law may restrict the scope of law
application and make “organizations often simply copy what other
organizations are doing”. 50 However, legal ambiguity may provide
“opportunities for circumventing or enabling implementation at the
local level”.51 Nolette, for example, suggests that the ambiguity of the
law grants prosecutors the opportunity to bring government-led
litigations and mobilize the law.52
In relation to the second factor, the party-state relies on the
cadre responsibility system to implement its policies or achieve its
49

Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. SOC'Y. 38,

41 (2000).

50

Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local
Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of
Hate Crime, 39 L. SOC'Y. REV. 893, 901 (2005).
51
Id. at 895; see also Kitty Calavita, Immigration, Law, and
Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain, 32 L. SOC'Y. REV. 529,
546 (1998); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1536-1538
(1992).
52
Paul Nolette, Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization: Reforming the
Pharmaceutical Industry through Government Litigation, 40 L. SOC. INQUIRY 123,
151 (2015).
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targets, such as environmental policy, 53 campaign enforcement, 54
maximization of tax revenues, 55 population control, 56 and the like.
Under the leadership of the party, government and legal institutions
(including courts and procuratorates) at all levels should conform to
the party’s political goals. Local party committees and upper-level
offices supervise the lower-level agencies to implement policies or
innovations through performance appraisal or evaluation, rewards (e.g.,
promotion, and monetary or symbolic rewards) as well as sanctions
(e.g., demotion, transfer-position, criticism and party discipline). 57
As for the last factor, law enforcers are by nature risk averse.58
Law enforcers calculate the expected organizational costs and benefits
before taking regulatory action. The existing literature often takes any
cost associated with risk aversion into consideration.59 In this study,
however, we focus on the following aspects, which are concerned with
the cost of regulation: the risk of losing cases, insufficient regulatory
capacity and the risk of offending local government (i.e., the lack of
regulatory autonomy), with the first two of these interacting with each
other. In the setting of prosecutorial regulation, negative litigation
outcome will significantly influence performance appraisal of the
Chinese prosecutorial organs, which impacts the personnel, financial
53

See, e.g., Wang, supra note 1; Kostka, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Benjamin van Rooij, China’s War on Graft: Politico-Legal
Campaigns Against Corruption in China and Their Similarities to the Legal
Reactions to Crisis in the U.S., 14 PAC. RIM L. POL'Y J. 298, 298-336 (2005); Susan
Trevaskes, POLICING SERIOUS CRIME IN CHINA: FROM “STRIKE HARD” TO “KILL
FEWER” 24-41 (2010).
55
Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State
Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 126 (1992); Ji Li, A Chinese Model for
Tax Reforms in Developing Countries?,THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS
CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 176, 176–202
(Weitseng Chen ed., 2015); Huina Xiao, Why Law Enforcement Is Weak in China:
The Mindset of the Frontline Tax Officials, 31 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 218, 226-227
(2018).
56
Kevin O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in
Rural China, 31 COMP. POL. 167, 172 (1999).
57
See Yongshun Cai, STATE AND AGENTS IN CHINA: DISCIPLINING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 63 (2017) (Party discipline includes five categories:
warned, seriously warned, removed from the position in the Party, on probation
with the Party, and expelled from the party.).
58
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1974).
59
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement
of Law 3-83, Working Paper No. 11780, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 1, 3-83
(2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11780.
54
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and material resources that the procuratorates can obtain, thus
influencing their regulatory capacity. In addition, to implement
policies and the law, prosecutorial organs must have adequate abilities
concerning personnel and budget resources, knowledge, information,
experience, administrative support, and the like. Insufficient capacity
leads to a high risk of losing cases and a high cost of legal
enforcement.60 Finally, a lack of regulatory autonomy, in other words,
“regulators’ susceptibility to external influence”, causes interferences
from local government agencies and party committees. 61 In
developing countries, regulatory organs tend to have weaknesses in
relation to autonomy and capacity, which leads to poor enforcement
outcomes.62 In this study, given that the negative litigation outcome
greatly matters for prosecutorial organs in terms of performance
appraisal, and their regulatory capacity and autonomy remain weak,
the costs of regulation through civil EPILs become a big concern for
them .
IV.

CHANGES IN REGULATORY MOTIVATION OF PROSECUTORIAL
ORGANS OVER THE THREE STAGES

The empirical data presented in part three of this article
demonstrate the changing practices of the Chinese prosecutorial
organs in engaging in civil EPILs over the three stages. Indeed, the
different practice of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in each stage shows
three different regulatory models, which have been labelled as follows:
“ad hoc regulation” through local innovation before July 2015; “forced
regulation” during the legal experiment from July 2015 to July 2017;
and “perfunctory regulation” after the nationwide establishment of the
prosecutor-led civil EPIL system in July 2017. This part further
investigates the dynamics of the underlying regulatory motivation of
prosecutorial organs that can help us to understand the changes in their
regulatory practices. As explained in part three, three factors (legal,
60

Benjamin van Rooij, Greening Industry Without Enforcement? An
Assessment of the World Bank’s Pollution Regulation Model for Developing
Countries, 32 L. POL'Y 127, 138 (2010); see alsovan Rooij & Lo, supra note 2.
61
Lesley K. Mcallister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution
Enforcement in Industrializing Countries, 32 L. POL'Y 1, 5 (2009).
62
Lesley K. McAllister, Dimensions of Enforcement Style: Factoring in
Regulatory Autonomy and Capacity, 32 L. POL'Y 61, 61-78 (2010); Benjamin Van
Rooij & Lesley McAllister, Environmental Challenges in Middle-Countries:A
Comparison of Enforcement in Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME
TRAP 288, 288–306 (Randall Peerenboom & Ginsburg Tom eds., 2014).
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political and organizational) that influence regulatory motivation were
adopted: the ambiguity or certainty of the law, the top-down political
pressure, and the cost of regulation (which is concerned with weak
capacity for regulation, lack of autonomy for regulation, and
performance appraisal of prosecutorial organs). These factors are
analyzed in detail for each of the three regulatory models of
prosecutorial organs.
A. “Ad Hoc Regulation”: Local Innovation before July 2015
In the first stage (i.e., before July 2015), the law was
ambiguous about the standing of prosecutorial organs to file civil
EPILs, but this legal ambiguity at the same time provided an
opportunity for legal innovation. In the dataset, a total of 31 civil EPIL
cases were filed in ten provincial areas (Figure 2): Guangdong
Province (7 cases), Shandong Province (6 cases), Zhejiang Province
(5 cases), Jiangxi Province (3 cases), Jiangsu Province (3 cases),
Sichuan Province (2 cases), Guizhou Province (2 case), Hunan
Province (1 case), Fujian Province (1 case) and, the city of Chongqing
(which is a municipality directly under the Central Government) (1
case). As analysed below, the number of civil EPILs was small due to
the legal ambiguity over the issue of procuratorate standing, the weak
political pressure for regulation and the high cost of regulation. Only
when there was a strong political need and a high degree of certainty
about winning the case would the local prosecutorial organs dare to
file an action. Therefore, the prosecutorial organ’s practice at the first
stage was termed “ad hoc regulation”, that is, prosecutorial regulation
happened sporadically in response to particular local needs.
1. Ambiguity of the Law regarding Standing
China’s first Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate that
was passed in 1954 granted prosecutorial organs the power to file or
participate in litigation in relation to significant civil cases that involve
the interests of the state and society. 63 Furthermore, the 1979 Civil
Procedure Law (Draft) had provisions regarding prosecutorial organs’
participation in civil lawsuits.64 However, when the Civil Procedure
63

ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATOERATES, art. 4, supra note 12.
Hui Zhao, Research and Analysis of Civil Procuratorial System (minshi
jiancha zhidu yanxi), 47.6 J. INNER MONGOLIA NORM UNIV. (PHILOSOPHY, SOC.
SCI.) (NEIMENGGU SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)) 28, 28
(2018).
64
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Law was finally promulgated in 1982, the draft provisions were not
included because some believed that prosecutorial organs should only
concentrate on criminal work.65
Before July 2015, the national legislature, the SPP and the
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) generally disapproved of prosecutorled public interest litigation. Article 15 of the Civil Procedure Law that
was amended in 1991 provides that “where an act has infringed upon
the civil rights and interests of the State, a collective organization or
an individual, any state organ, public organization, enterprise or
institution may support the injured unit or individual to bring an action
in a people’s court”. The law only entitled prosecutorial organs, as
State organs, to “support” but not “participate in” civil litigations.
Moreover, in 2004, the SPC replied to a local court which asked for
instructions about the case of En’shi Autonomous Prefecture
Procuratorate v. Zhang Suwen (regarding returning state property)
that a prosecutor-led civil litigation in the name of the State for the
purpose of protecting state property and public interest should not be
accepted by the people’s courts because of an absence of legal
authority. 66 Subsequently, the SPP also issued a notice announcing
that the people’s procuratorates could not bring any civil or
administrative litigation without the approval of the SPP.67 After that,
local prosecutorial organs stopped initiating such litigations.
However, with the establishment of a special environmental
division within local courts, local legislators and the local judiciary (in
particular, in Guizhou Province, Jiangsu Province and Yunnan
Province) issued local regulations to grant prosecutorial organs
standing to sue in civil EPIL. For instance, in 2007, the Intermediate
People’s Court of Guiyang City clarified in its judicial interpretation
that the people’s procuratorates were entitled to file EPIL.68 In 2009,
the People’s Congress of Guiyang City passed a local regulation
(difangxing fagui 地方性法规) titled “the Regulations on Promoting
65

Id. Liu, supra note 9, at 55 n.50.
SPC, REPLIY ON THE ENSHI CITY PEOPEL'S PROCURATORATE V. ZHANG
SUWEN FOR RETURNING STATE PROPERTY CASE (Promulgated on Jun. 17, 2004).
67
Zixin Zhang, The Standing of the People’s Procuratorate to File Public
Interest Litigations and Special Features (renmin jianchayuan tiqi gongyi susong
de diwei ji qi teshuxing), 11 CHINESE PROCURATORS (ZHONGGUO JIANCHAGUAN)
59, 60 (2019).
68
Alex Wang & Gao Jie, Environmental Courts and the Development of
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION. 37, 38
(2010).
66
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the Construction of an Ecological Civilization”,69 which was the first
local regulation to empower the people’s procuratorate to lodge civil
EPIL. 70 Moreover, in 2008, the Intermediate People’s Court, the
People’s Procuratorate and the Legal Affairs Office of the People’s
Government in Wuxi City of Jiangsu Province jointly promulgated the
Interim Regulations on the Handling of Civil EPIL Cases,71 which was
the first set of local administrative rules (difangxing xingzheng
guizhang 地 方 性 行 政 规 章 ) emphasizing that the people’s
procuratorate should take the lead in engaging in civil EPIL.72
Despite the absence of a national legal authority, with a green
light from the local authority, local prosecutorial organs undertook the
legal innovation of civil EPIL. For example, in the case of the
Municipal People’s Procuratorate of Guiyang City v Xiong Jinzhi, Lei
Zhang and Chen Tingyu (2008), the Municipal People’s Procuratorate
of Guiyang City sued three violators of environmental law, requesting
them to stop damaging Turtle Hill in Aha Lake and restore the
vegetation they had destroyed in this area. Its standing to sue was
upheld by the Intermediate People’s Court of Guiyang City.73 Where
there lacked local regulation or judicial interpretation to support the
procuratorate’s legal standing, in order to justify the prosecutorial
organ’s standing in civil EPIL some local judges developed an
innovative but controversial expanded interpretation and application
of Article 6 of the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s
Republic of China, 74 which stipulates that all units and individuals
have the obligation to protect the environment.75
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In August 2012, the Civil Procedure Law was amended to add
a new provision, Article 55, that allows State organs prescribed by law
or relevant organizations to bring a lawsuit for environmental pollution
that damages public interests. However, the provision does not clarify
which State organs and relevant organizations have standing to sue in
civil EPIL. The ambiguity of the national law regarding the plaintiff’s
qualification almost turned the green light of the local authority to red
and largely discouraged prosecutorial organs from filing civil EPIL at
courts thereafter (Figure 2). In January 2015, the SPC reiterated that
prosecutorial organs should only support social organizations to bring
civil EPILs according to Article 15 of the Civil Procedure Law.76 At
that point, Chinese law had still not clarified the standing of
prosecutorial organs to file civil actions in the public interest.
2. Weak Political Pressure for Regulation
In the first stage, the political pressure for regulation emerged
with the local governments’ concern about social instability resulting
from deteriorating environmental pollution. 77 When serious
environmental violations gave rise to public outcries, local
governments had to respond and take action to punish the polluters.
For instance, in the case of the Municipal Procuratorate of Yueling
City of Shandong Province v Fan Jinhe Case (2003), the citizens in
Yueling City complained about the severe air pollution caused by
Fan’s factory. As a result, the local government promised a sanction
as a quid pro quo for the citizens’ claim to stop the pollution.78 In
another case, the Basic Procuratorate of Bishan County of Chonqing
City v Chongqing Ou’Yong Livestock Cultivation Cooperative (2010),
poultry waste had fouled the Binan River and destroyed the habitats of
species. The local government, the local party committee and the local
prosecutorial organ were determined to resolve the problem. After
seeking approval from the upper-level prosecutorial organ, the district76
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level procuratorate filed an action against the polluter.79 Although they
received ad hoc requests from the local government or party
committee, prosecutorial organs at this stage faced little political
pressure to lodge civil EPILs.
3. High Cost of Regulation
Despite an opportunity for legal innovation due to the
ambiguity of the law, prosecutorial organs had to calculate the costs of
filing civil EPILs. The most prominent cost related to the risk of losing
the case, which could significantly influence their ranking among all
local procuratorates in the annual performance appraisal conducted by
their upper-level procuratorate. The performance appraisal mechanism
was initially established to enhance prosecutorial work and
management. 80 According to Yu, who conducted interviews in a
district-level procuratorate, the performance appraisal mechanism
comprised two parts: “quantity” (shu 数) and “rate” (lü 率). The
quantity evaluation concerned the number of criminal cases initiated,
the number of prosecutions of escaped criminals, and the number of
protests of judicial decisions on criminal cases. The rate evaluation,
which was more important, concerned the rate of cases closed, the
quality of cases initiated, the rate of change of protested judicial
decisions on criminal cases and the success rate of protests of judicial
decisions on criminal cases. Among all these elements, the quality of
cases initiated, which referred to the rate of acquittal and the rate of
withdrawal, was the most important because it accounted for 40
percent of performance appraisal scores (Figure 11). 81 As Yu has
suggested, “if an acquittal is issued by the court or the prosecutorial
organ withdraws a case because of insufficient evidence, it will have a
veto effect on annual performance appraisals and all staff from the
79
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chief prosecutor down to basic-level personnel are required to jointly
bear the responsibility. This is a fatal blow to a prosecutorial organ.”82
In addition, prosecutorial organs would be either punished or rewarded
based on their ranking among all local procuratorates in terms of
annual performance appraisal. For example, the procuratorates at the
district level that ranked in the bottom three had to submit a report to
identify problems and make improvement plans, 83 while the
prosecutors working in those ranked in the top three over three
consecutive years might have an opportunity to gain promotion, obtain
a role model reward, or receive monetary benefits.84
Figure 11. Performance Appraisal Elements for a District-Level
Procuratorate85
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The same criteria of performance appraisal applied to
prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs. Under the pressure of the
performance appraisal and inter-organizational competition, local
prosecutorial organs were often reluctant to initiate civil EPILs
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because they lacked the capacity and confidence to win cases. A
prosecutor from a northwest province told us in our interview:
There are risks of lodging ordinary civil litigations. First, it is
difficult for prosecutorial organs to engage in civil litigations,
as it requires stronger capacity than that required in criminal
cases. Some large companies have stronger litigation capacity
and are more professional than we are. Second, it brings great
pressure to the prosecutorial organs if they lose the lawsuits,
especially in the circumstances where more than 95 percent of
criminal cases end with successful conviction in court. Despite
few political risks, we procuratorates are subject to much
pressure of performance appraisal. Our annual performance
appraisal may rank the bottom if we lose a single case … The
prosecutors who lose the case are also subject to pressure
within the organization. That would be very tough for us.
Although filing environmental civil EPILs can help a prosecutorial
organ achieve innovation rewards,86 this only happens if it succeeds at
court. Another prosecutor from Guangdong province, who filed six
civil EPIL cases between 2003 and 2014, admitted that prosecutorial
organs at municipal or district level sought approvals and instructions
from the upper-level prosecutorial organs as well as the local courts.
This echoes the previous observations regarding the prosecutorial
practice of handling criminal litigation called “pipelining processing”
(liushuixian zuoye 流水线作业) or “reversed criminal procedure”
(xingshi chengxu daoliu 刑 事 程 序 倒 流 ). It refers to the internal
cooperation and communication among the police, prosecutorial
organs and courts before prosecutors bring criminal cases to the court
in order to ensure conviction.87 Therefore, the risk of losing cases is an
86
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organizational cost for prosecutorial organs to engage in civil EPILs.
As long as the winning rate-oriented performance appraisal
mechanism remains unchanged, the motivation of prosecutorial organs
to file civil EPILs will be restricted.
The other cost of engaging in civil EPILs concerned regulatory
capacity and autonomy. The weak capacity of prosecutorial organs
with respect to the shortage of knowledge and experience regarding
ordinary civil litigation, case information, funding and human
resources also contributed to their reluctance to file civil EPILs. In
terms of human resources, many prosecutorial organs at municipal and
district levels were only equipped with three to four prosecutors in
charge of legal supervision of civil and administrative cases, with their
work including the handling of EPILs. According to an interview at
the People’s Procuratorate of Laoshan District of Qingdao City of
Shandong Province,88 out of all the offices in this organization, only
three staff were designated to the Office of Legal Supervision of Civil
and Administrative Cases, and they had to handle 20 civil and
administrative cases in the first half of 2009. In terms of financial
resources, prosecutorial organs did not charge the parties a fee to
protest judicial decisions on civil cases. With limited budgets, they
lacked funding to file civil EPILs, which required them to hire and pay
experts to provide expert opinions to support their claims. 89 If
prosecutorial organs lost the case, they would have to bear high
litigation costs.90
Moreover, as noted in part one of this article, the dependence
of prosecutorial organs on the local government and party committee
also demotivated them to file civil EPILs against local corporates, in
particular, large and listed companies. When those big corporate
taxpayers were sued by prosecutorial organs in civil EPILs, the local
government would intervene because it was afraid that such litigations
could scare its large-sized corporate taxpayers away.91 Therefore, the
88
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weak regulatory autonomy of prosecutorial organs further increased
their cost of regulation in filing civil EPILs.
4. Summary
The first stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs
is labelled as “ad hoc regulation”. The ambiguity of the law provided
opportunities to some prosecutorial organs and courts to develop local
innovation of civil EPIL in response to serious environmental
violations. With the growing political concerns over environmental
protection, owing to monetary or non-monetary rewards for legal
innovation, local prosecutorial organs were also encouraged to file
civil EPILs.92 Such forces, however, were insufficient to route civil
EPILs into the mainstream work of prosecutorial organs due to the
high cost of regulation. In general, procuratorates at local levels were
reluctant to engage in civil litigations because of the winning rateoriented performance appraisal mechanism. Their regulatory
motivation was also weakened by the lack of regulatory capacity and
autonomy when engaging in civil litigations against polluters. 93
Despite sporadic cases in some provinces, local prosecutorial organs
were unwilling to devote much energy to the practice of civil EPILs.
B. “Forced Regulation”: Experimental Reform from July 2015
to July 2017
China started to experiment with prosecutor-led EPILs in July
2015. Since then, the standing of prosecutorial organs to sue in civil
EPILs has been confirmed and the relevant procedural rules regarding
civil EPILs have gradually developed. With strong top-down political
pressure to implement this legal innovation, prosecutorial organs have
become better equipped and empowered with more autonomy. In the
second stage, the number of civil EPIL cases grew by 142 percent
compared with the first stage, from 31 cases up to 75 cases (Figure 5).
More prosecutorial organs became involved in the practice of civil
EPILs. However, during the two-year legal experiment, the fully
loaded political pressure for regulation and concerns over the cost of
regulation combined to produce an undesirable outcome, that is,
prosecutorial organs tended to file civil EPILs with less complicated
facts and concerning less serious instances of environmental pollution.
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This second stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs is
termed as “forced regulation”.
1. Certainty of the Law regarding the Standing of Prosecutorial
Organs
On July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress (“NPCSC”), the national legislature, promulgated
the Decision on Authorizing the SPP to Launch the Pilot Scheme to
Initiate PILs in Certain Areas (“Pilot Scheme”) (Table 3). It authorized
the SPP to experiment with public interest litigations in thirteen
selected provincial areas (Beijing, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, Jilin Province, Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province, Fujian
Province, Shandong Province, Hubei Province, Guangdong Province,
Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, Shannxi Province, and Gansu
Province) in the area of ecological environment and resource
protection, preservation of state-owned assets, transfer of state-owned
land use rights, and food and drug safety.94
The SPP subsequently published two sets of judicial
interpretations to clarify the procedural rules of public interest
litigations, including the scope of application, the jurisdiction of the
procuratorate, the pretrial, the claims as well as the power to protest
judgments on civil EPIL cases: one was the Plan for the Pilot Scheme
of Initiating PILs by People’s Procuratorates95 issued on July 2, 2015,
and the other was the Measures for the Implementation of the Pilot
Scheme of Initiating PILs by People’s Procuratorates 96 issued on
December 16, 2015 (Table 3). The SPP designated the Office of Legal
Supervision of Civil and Administrative Cases to handle public
interest litigations and increased its staff for the purpose of promoting
the work of public interest litigations.97
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At the same time, to deal with public interest litigations brought
by prosecutorial organs, the SPC issued the Measures for the
Implementation of the Pilot Program of Trial by People’s Courts of
Public Interest Litigations Initiated by the People’s Procuratorates98 on
February 25, 2016 (Table 3). This judicial interpretation stipulates the
procedural rules of public interest litigations concerning the
jurisdiction of the court, the documents that prosecutorial organs
should submit to lodge a case, the announcement period of the
settlement agreement reached through negotiation or mediation, as
well as the party’s right to appeal and the procuratorate’s power to
protest judgements on civil EPIL cases.99 On April 1, 2017, the SPC
made another judicial interpretation titled the Interim Working Rules
on the Trials of Environmental Public Interest Litigations.100 It applies
to civil EPILs filed by both non-governmental organizations and
prosecutorial organs (Table 3). The SPC clarified and supplemented
the procedural rules for prosecutor-led civil EPILs regarding the
court’s explanations issued to the procuratorate about nonconformance with the conditions of filing a lawsuit and claims that are
not well-founded, the presence of the prosecutor in court, the
exemption of litigation fees and the procuratorate’s right to appeal and
retrial. 101 Different from the SPP, which argued that prosecutorial
organs should be distinguished from the plaintiff in civil litigation
because they serve as legal supervisors of the State,102 the SPC was
inclined to treat prosecutorial organs as the normal plaintiff, an equal
party to the defendant in civil EPIL.
In sum, the Pilot Scheme granted prosecutorial organs in the
13 pilot areas standing to bring civil EPILs from July 2015 to July
2017, thus eliminating the legal ambiguity regarding the issue of
standing. In the second stage, the SPP and the SPC also introduced
much clearer procedural rules for pursuing such litigations. Despite its
limited application to the selected provincial areas, the law of
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prosecutor-led civil EPILs created much greater certainty than there
had been in the first stage.
Table 3. Laws and Judicial Interpretations on PILs brought by the
Prosecutorial Organs after 2015

2. Strong Political Pressure for Regulation
The Pilot Scheme of prosecutor-led PILs firstly became party
policy during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central
Committee in 2014.103 The CPC suggested that the SPP and the SPC
103
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should lead a reform to “seek to allow the people’s procuratorates to
file public interest litigations”.104 The clock was thus set ticking. To
accomplish this legal reform, several supporting mechanisms were
adopted. First of all, the SPP and the SPC headed the legal experiment
and other offices (such as the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs
Commission, the Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee of the
National People’s Congress, the Legislative Affairs Commission of
the NPCSC, and the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council)
were included in the group. 105 Meanwhile, local governments and
party committees also paid great attention to the experimental reform
set out in the Pilot Scheme and participated in extensive
communication and cooperation.106 The party sub-committees within
the pilot procuratorates were required to enhance the leadership of the
work of public interest litigations and treat it as a “significant
assignment”. 107 These organizational arrangements promoted
information exchange and helped gather collective resources to
implement the legal reform in the selected local areas.
Second, the performance of the pilot procuratorates was
closely monitored by the upper-level procuratorates. The SPP often
called meetings with all pilot procuratorates in order to report on
progress, exchange information, share experiences, and provide
guidance for subsequent work. It published on a monthly basis about
the progress made on initiating public interest litigations and published
guiding cases. The SPP further established a supervisory group to
monitor the handling of some significant cases of public interest
litigation.108 It also initiated a movement called “Filling the Blank”
(jiejue kongbai 解决空白), requiring every pilot procuratorate to file
at least one public interest litigation during the second stage. An
internal report about the work progress of prosecutor-led public
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interest litigations, documented by the SPP, included the following
statement:
Up to the end of June 2017, all 87 procuratorates at the
municipal level have initiated public interest litigations; of the
759 procuratorates at the district level, 736 has filed public
interest litigations and this accounts for 96.97 percent. Except
for Beijing City and Jiangsu Province, other prosecutorial
organs in the pilot areas have all filled the blank.109
Under top-down political pressure for regulation, local
prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas were forced to emphasize the
work of PILs and mobilize various resources to carry it out. For
instance, the provincial prosecutorial organ in a western China pilot
province required all municipal procuratorates within the province
to initiate at least one action of public interest litigation before
March 2016 and the district-level procuratorates to file at least one
action of public interest litigation before June 2016. Li noted a
downside to this approach in commenting that the prosecutorial
organs in these pilot areas “only pursue the result and ignore the
process”.110
Finally, adopting a carrot-and-stick approach, the SPP and
provincial procuratorates in the pilot areas provided rewards to
encourage local innovations that promoted public interest litigations.
The rewards included propagandizing local innovations as good
practice and naming the pilot areas coming up with local innovations
in the SPP and the SPC’s work reports. For instance, positive
references were made in an official publication of the SPP to the
establishment of case databases of public interest litigations by the
procuratorates of Guangdong Province and Gansu Province.111
3. Reduced Cost of Regulation
In the second stage, the number of prosecutors dealing with
public interest litigations was increased in order to facilitate the legal
109
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experiment. The SPP approved the addition of 86 municipal-level
procurators and 761 district-level procurators to implement the Pilot
Scheme. 112 The prosecutors in charge of public interest litigations
shared knowledge and experiences with each other.113 Moreover, the
autonomy of local prosecutorial organs was also improved. In order to
protect prosecutors from local interference and local protectionism, the
prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas adopted three measures. First, as
leaders in the work on public interest litigations, the local party
committees played a role in restricting interference from the local
government. For example, the party committee of Yiwu City in
Zhejiang province made the first guideline in the country that
supported prosecutors to file public interest litigations. 114 Second,
some local procuratorates designated the work of public interest
litigations to the Railroad Transportation Prosecutorial Organ (a
special people’s procuratorate, Figure 1), which is directly responsible
to the provincial procuratorate. 115 Third, the SPP established a
supervisory group and launched several enforcement campaigns on
land pollution, water protection, forest and grassland protection and
the like to vertically and directly monitor and control the progress of
significant cases of public interest litigation.116
Although these measures could, to some extent, help reduce the
cost of regulation of prosecutorial organs, their impact should not be
exaggerated. Despite more procurators participating in the work of
public interest litigations, they had to go through a process of learning
and gradually accumulating knowledge and experiences of handling
civil EPILs. It remained difficult for prosecutorial organs to find
sufficient clues to civil EPIL cases, either from the general public or
from other government agencies. In terms of financial resources,
prosecutorial organs still struggled to secure funding that was needed
112
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to afford litigation expenses (such as expenses incurred collecting
evidence and hiring experts) even though the SPC had exempted their
litigation fees for the filing of civil EPILs with the promulgation of the
Interim Working Rules on the Trials of Environmental Public Interest
Litigations in April 2017 (Table 3).
Moreover, in terms of regulatory autonomy, even though the
vertical pressure and empowerment of prosecutorial organs could help
them mitigate the risk of going against local governments, their
regulatory motivation and performance remained restricted by the lack
of regulatory autonomy. One of the interviewees from a northwest
province provided an example. A prosecutorial organ at the district
level found that a local large chemical company had illegally emitted
air pollutants. Although the local EPB made an administrative decision
to impose a fine of RMB 50,000 and required the company to rectify
the situation in one month, the company failed to comply with the
decision and continued to pollute. The local prosecutorial organ
decided to initiate a civil public interest litigation against the
company. 117 However, the local government did not allow this to
happen. The interviewee said: “The prosecutor in charge of this case
told me that he will resign after finishing the case.” He added that such
a situation had not just occurred in one case – local prosecutorial
organs faced constant local interference when handling civil EPILs.
4. Summary
In the second stage, the case number of prosecutor-led civil
EPILs greatly increased and more prosecutorial organs participated in
the practice of civil EPILs. This resulted from the certainty of the law
regarding the standing of prosecutorial organs and the procedural rules
regarding civil EPILs as well as the strong political pressure for
regulation during the legal experiment period. However, given the
reduced but still high cost of regulation, the pilot prosecutorial organs
strategically chose to file civil EPILs that had less complicated facts,
easily accessible evidence, and involved minor environmental
violations and small and weak defendants compared with the civil
EPIL cases filed in the first stage. Therefore, in this article the second
stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs is characterized
as “forced regulation”.
117
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C. “Perfunctory Regulation”: Nationwide Implementation after
July 2017
After the two-year legal experiment, the prosecutor-led civil
EPIL was formally written into the Civil Procedure Law in July 2017
(Table 3). Since then, the nationwide prosecutorial organs have been
allowed to file civil litigations against environmental polluters. In 2018,
the number of such litigations grew by 472 cases compared with 75
cases in the second stage (Figure 5). This mainly resulted from the
certainty of the law regarding civil EPILs across the country. However,
this was accompanied by an increased tendency of prosecutorial
organs to select easier cases, small and weak defendants, and minor
environmental violations and damage. This is partly because the
political pressure for regulation imposed on prosecutorial organs has
become weak while the cost of regulation remains relatively high. This
third stage of the prosecutor-led civil EPIL practice is termed
“perfunctory regulation” in this article.
1. Nationwide Certainty of the Law
On June 27, 2017, the NPCSC added the second section of
Article 55 of the Civil Procedure Law to legalize the practice of
prosecutor-led civil EPILs.118 The section stipulates as follows:
Where the people’s procuratorate finds in the performance of
functions any conduct that undermines the protection of the
ecological environment and resources, infringes upon
consumers’ lawful rights and interests in the field of food and
drug safety or any other conduct that damages the public
interests, it may file a lawsuit with the people’s court if there is
no State organ or organization prescribed in the preceding
section or the State organ or organization prescribed in the
preceding section does not file a lawsuit. If the State organ or
organization prescribed in the preceding section files a lawsuit,
the people’s procuratorate may support the filing of the lawsuit.
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Subsequently, the SPC and the SPP jointly promulgated the
Interpretation on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law for
Public Interest Litigations Initiated by the People’s Procuratorates
(“Joint Interpretation”) on February 23, 2018.119 Echoing Article 55(2)
of the Civil Procedure Law, Article 13 of the Joint Interpretation
provides that prosecutorial organs should make a public announcement
30 days before bringing an action of EPIL to the courts. As a result,
the legal ambiguity regarding the standing of prosecutorial organs has
been eliminated in the country.
2. Weak Political Pressure for Regulation
After the legal experiment was conducted successfully and the
national law established the standing of prosecutorial organs to sue in
civil EPILs, the political pressure for regulation through civil EPILs
was significantly reduced to the extent that it has become weak in the
third stage. The corresponding mechanisms operating in the second
stage also faded away and so without vertical supervision and
monitoring prosecutorial organs are now less incentivized to lodge
civil EPILs. Moreover, Article 55(2) of the Civil Procedure Law and
Article 13 of the Joint Interpretation lay down the principle that
prosecutorial organs should bring an action for civil EPIL only when
there is no State organ or organization that is eligible to file a civil
EPIL or the relevant State organ or organization fails to file one.
Because prosecutor-led civil EPILs are seen as the last resort to protect
environmental public interests, the overall political pressure for
regulation through civil EPILs has become much weaker in the third
stage compared to the previous one.
Recently, the SPP initiated a new scheme titled “Four Major
Procuratorships” to promote and balance the procuratorate’s work on
criminal, civil, administrative and public interest litigations. 120 This
indicates that the SPP will play a more active role as the representative
of public interests and pay more attention to the work of public interest
litigation than before. However, prosecutor-led public interest
litigations are not only limited to civil EPILs but also include other
forms such as prosecutor-led administrative EPILs and public interest
119
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litigations that aim to protect public interests other than environmental
ones (such as mass consumer interests, state-owned assets, stateowned land use rights, and cultural heritage). The SPP’s decision to
strengthen the work of public interest litigation does not guarantee that
civil EPILs will remain a focal point in the future agenda of
prosecutorial organs. In other words, prosecutorial organs will still be
able to fulfil their mission regarding public interest litigation
designated by the upper-level procuratorates if they shift the focus of
their work to other forms of public interest litigations. For instance,
when submitting a report on the work of prosecutor-led public interest
litigations to the NPCSC in October 2019, the SPP highlighted that the
total number of recorded public interest litigations in various forms
reached 214,740 cases, the total number of public interest litigations
filed in the courts reached 6,353 cases, and the total number of
recorded EPILs reached 118,012 cases (accounting for 54.96 percent)
between July 2017 and September 2019.121 But in terms of EPILs filed
in the courts, the report was silent about whether those cases were
solved through civil or administrative EPILs.
3. Reducing but Still High Cost of Regulation (and Work-focus
Shift to Administrative EPIL)
In the third stage, prosecutorial organs under the leadership of
the SPP have undergone two changes that might help enhance their
regulatory capacity and reduce their cost of regulation. First, the SPP
divided the previous Office of Legal Supervision of Civil and
Administrative Cases at the various levels of the people’s
procuratorates into three separate offices: the Office of Legal
Supervision of Civil Cases, the Office of Legal Supervision of
Administrative Cases and the Office of Public Interest Litigations.122
The Office of Public Interest Litigations is equipped with independent
financial and human resources so that prosecutorial organs may obtain
more capacity for handling public interest litigations efficiently and
professionally. Second, the SPP required that every provincial area
121
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should have at least one environmental authentication institution that
is willing to provide expert opinions without advance payment of
authentication expenses. Therefore, prosecutorial organs are able to
save on the expense of hiring experts until a judicial decision is made
by a court, and the defendant will be ordered to pay authentication fees
if it loses the case.123 This can somewhat reduce the financial cost for
prosecutorial organs in filing civil EPILs.
However, the roles of the above innovations in reducing the
cost of regulation of prosecutorial organs are limited. Their lack of
knowledge and experiences of dealing with civil litigation cannot be
solved merely through setting up a separate office in charge of public
interest litigations. The high cost of regulation associated with the
success rate of litigation remains a big concern of prosecutorial organs
when calculating the cost of regulation through civil EPILs because
the same performance appraisal mechanism still operates within the
procuratorate system in the third stage. Despite the second innovation
mentioned above, prosecutorial organs still need to bear authentication
expenses if they lose lawsuits. Such a practice will still cause them
very much care about the success rate of civil EPILs and become
cautious in case selection. In terms of the regulatory autonomy of
prosecutorial organs, their lack of resistance to local interference
remains unchanged since the local governments and party committees
withdrew their special support for the purpose of implementing party
policy and facilitating the legal experiment during the second stage.
Moreover, in the third stage, prosecutorial organs have
demonstrated a clear shift of their work focus from civil to
administrative EPILs. Together with the legal experiment on civil
EPILs, the legal experiment on administrative EPILs was also
conducted in the second stage.124 According to Article 25(4) of the
Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
amended on June 27, 2017,125 when a prosecutorial organ finds that an
administrative organ with the duties of supervision and administration
in the field of environment and resource protection fails to perform its
duties and causes damage to the national interest or social and public
interests, the prosecutorial organ has the power to issue a “letter of
123
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prosecutorial suggestions” (jiancha jianyishu 检察建议书) to that
administrative organ and put pressure on the latter to perform its duties
pursuant to the law. The administrative organ should follow the
prosecutorial suggestions and reply in written form to the prosecutorial
organ within two months of receiving the suggestions. If there is an
emergent risk of incurring further damage, it should reply in written
form within 15 days.126 The case will be closed in the pre-proceeding
stage if the administrative organ complies with the prosecutorial
suggestions. Otherwise, the prosecutorial organ has the power to file
an administrative litigation against the administrative organ.127
The parties to administrative EPILs are prosecutorial organs on
the one hand and the delinquent administrative organ on the other.
Filing administrative EPILs is indeed part of the procuratorate’s work
of legal supervision over administrative agencies to ensure that their
activities conform to the law. Administrative EPILs focus on the legal
supervision of administrative organs which fail to discharge their
duties over environmental and resource protection. The finding in this
article is that prosecutorial organs have been more active in engaging
in administrative EPILs than in civil ones, demonstrating an obvious
shift in the work focus of prosecutorial organs in the third stage.
Table 4 presents a comparison between the civil EPIL work
and the administrative EPIL work of prosecutorial organs during the
second stage and during the first four months of 2019 – this was used
as a sample for the third stage due to the availability of data. It shows
that prosecutorial organs generally prefer administrative to civil public
interest litigations. In terms of the number of cases on file,
administrative EPILs accounted for 93.68 percent from January to
April 2019, much higher than that of civil EPILs (6.32 percent) during
the same period. Although the regulatory capacity of prosecutorial
organs has been enhanced in the third stage, most of the organizational
resources are spent on administrative EPIL work, leading to civil EPIL
work being marginalized or rendered a “decoration” (peichen 陪衬).128
Moreover, although prosecutorial organs are devoted to administrative
126
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EPIL work, they have actually filed a much smaller percentage of
administrative EPILs at the courts in the third stage (9.48 percent) than
the second stage (21.65 percent). This means that most administrative
EPILs are solved in the pre-trial stage and litigation is not common.
Table 4. Comparison between Civil and Administrative EPIL Work of
Prosecutorial Organs

Source: SPP’s work report on the prosecutor-led PIL in the pilot areas (June 2017);
SPP’s work report on the national prosecutor-led PIL (January - February 2019), and
SPP’s work report on the national prosecutor-led PIL (March -April 2019). We could
not find the work report in 2018. These report files are with the authors.

The work-focus shift of prosecutorial organs to pre-trial
resolution of administrative EPILs resulted from an institutional
calculation of the cost of regulation in terms of the availability of clues
to cases, difficulties of handling cases, and other organizational
benefits concerned. 129 In other words, administrative EPIL work
requires a lower cost of regulation than civil EPIL but is likely to
generate effects of regulation more valued by the SPP. Specifically,
first, prosecutorial organs can more easily obtain and access clues to
administrative EPILs than those of civil EPILs.130 As Table 4 shows,
81.90 percent of clues to cases were administrative, and only 18.10
percent were civil in the second stage. In the first four months of 2019,
the percentage of clues to administrative case increased by 12.35
percent and reached 94.25 percent while that of clues to civil case
129
130
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decreased to 5.75 percent. As the state organ of legal supervision,
prosecutorial organs have much experience supervising and
monitoring administrative agencies. The easy accessibility of clues to
administrative cases therefore helps to save on the cost of regulation
in the practice of EPILs.
Second, prosecutorial organs have fewer difficulties in
handling administrative EPILs than in handing civil EPILs. The key
legal issue for prosecutorial organs to prove in administrative EPILs is
a dereliction of duty on the part of the administrative agency,131 and it
is not so difficult for prosecutorial organs to obtain the relevant
evidence given their rich experiences concerning legal supervision of
administrative organs. In civil EPILs, however, prosecutorial organs
have to deal with much more complicated facts, legal issues as well as
claims, and spend more financial and human resources collecting
evidence regarding the issues of unlawfulness, fault, causation and
damages.132
Third, prosecutorial organs may obtain their organizational
benefits through administrative EPILs. As Table 4 shows, most
administrative EPIL cases are closed before litigation as the
Administrative Procedure Law allows prosecutorial organs to issue a
letter of prosecutorial suggestions as a precondition for filing
administrative public interest litigation, and thus have a chance to
negotiate with the targeted administrative organs. A prosecutor from
Shaanxi Province told us in our interview that:
Prosecutorial organs focus more on administrative EPILs
because the handling of administrative cases is less costly.
Prosecutorial organs are encouraged to close the cases in the
pre-trial stage. During the legal experiment, local
administrative institutions were on their guard for the possible
risks of being sued by prosecutorial organs. After the legal
experiment, they knew what would happen and came up with
a routinized mechanism with the local prosecutorial organs.
Both sides thus enhanced cooperation, which turned out to be
good.
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This statement echoes that of another prosecutor from Guangdong
Province that we interviewed:
During 2015 and 2017, Guangdong Province, among the first
batch of pilot areas, brought a number of administrative public
interest litigations. Now we become more rational because our
ultimate goal is not suing an administrative organ. Instead, we
want to solve environmental problems. The current practice is
to issue a letter of prosecutorial suggestions. If administrative
organs reply and correct their misconducts, prosecutorial
organs will not sue them … Now we deal with such cases
through pre-trial resolution …
Indeed, due to a lack of autonomy, local prosecutorial organs
bring lawsuits against local governments with great caution. At the
same time, local procuratorates are also motivated to make use of their
authority of legal supervision over administrative organs as a
bargaining chip so that they can mobilize more political and
organizational resources. Such a motivation has become much
stronger after the anti-corruption office was removed from the
prosecutorial system, which lost political advantages in trading with
local governments. The administrative public interest litigation system
provides such an opportunity. As a prosecutor from Fujian Province
told us: “we want to enhance our supervisory power through
administrative public interest litigations to impose more pressure on
the local government.” In their article, Weng and Zhou also advance a
similar view:
The establishment of the National Supervisory Commission
has greatly weakened the prosecutorial power. After removing
the centralized power of investigating corruption cases, the
prosecutorial organs are badly in need of a new authority to fill
this vacuum. Therefore, some local procuratorates have
suggested changing from playing ‘anti-corruption card’ to
playing ‘legal supervision card.’ Obviously, to be the plaintiffs
of public interest litigation is a chance … prosecutorial organs
should regard it as a ‘new spin-off business’.133
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4. Summary
In the third stage, prosecutorial organs nationwide have been
given the standing to sue in civil EPILs and the legal ambiguity has
been completely removed. Prosecutorial regulation through civil
EPILs has instead become part of the procuratorate’s responsibilities
and its routine work. Prosecutorial organs have to file civil EPILs
against polluters in order to discharge their responsibility in this regard.
According to an official report, Chinese environmental protection
bureaus imposed administrative sanctions on 186,000 cases in 2018,
while the number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs nationwide was
1,021, 134 accounting for 0.55 percent of the administrative
sanctions. 135 Therefore, only a small fraction of the environmental
pollution cases escalated to civil EPILs are being brought by
prosecutorial organs. On the other hand, with the weak political
pressure for regulation and the continued high cost of regulation,
prosecutorial organs are inclined to choose less complicated cases
involving minor environmental pollution, weak and small defendants,
and a small amount of monetary claims. Moreover, in the third stage,
prosecutorial organs have devoted most of their efforts to
administrative EPILs because of the lower cost of regulation in
engaging in such administrative cases, which further weakens the
regulatory motivation of prosecutorial organs to pursue civil EPILs.
Despite the enhanced financial and human resources, prosecutorial
organs have tended to use them to deal with administrative but not civil
EPIL work. For this reason, the third stage of prosecutorial regulation
through civil EPILs has been characterized as “perfunctory regulation”.
CONCLUSION
This article classifies the regulatory practices of the Chinese
prosecutorial organs in terms of lodging civil environmental public
interest litigations against polluters from 2003 to 2018 into three stages:
local innovation before July 2015, legal experiment from July 2015 to
July 2017, and nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil
EPIL system after July 2017. The empirical findings show that the
overall number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs has grown throughout the
134
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three stages, whereas the percentage of cases with complicated facts,
strong corporate polluters, severe environmental violations, and high
damage amounts has decreased in turn. In other words, prosecutorial
organs have been filing more and more civil EPIL cases, but they have
a strong preference for cases with less complicated facts, weak and
small defendants, minor environmental violations, and small amounts
of monetary damage. Therefore, although the Chinese prosecutorial
regulators are more than a paper tiger, they are also far from being a
tiger with sharp teeth.
To further explain the changes in prosecutorial regulation
through civil EPILs in China, the article examined the regulatory
motivation of prosecutorial organs over the three stages, investigating
the dynamics of three factors that influence regulatory motivation:
ambiguity of the law (legal factor), top-down political pressure for
regulation (political factor), and organizational cost of regulation
(organizational factor). The three stages of the regulatory practice of
prosecutorial organs present three models resulting from the dynamic
combination of the legal, political and organizational factors. Without
the political pressure for regulation and the certainty of the law, and
with the high cost of regulation, the prosecutorial organs only engaged
in environmental regulation sporadically. This was the “ad hoc
regulation” of the first stage. Under an authoritarian political regime,
the top-down political pressure for regulation forced prosecutorial
organs in the pilot areas to file civil EPILs against environmental
polluters despite the continued high cost of regulation. This was the
“forced regulation” of the second stage. When top-down political
pressure for regulation becomes weak, prosecutorial organs retreat and
carry out the civil EPIL work without real determination. This is the
“perfunctory regulation” of the third stage (Table 5).
This study finds that the legal ambiguity provided
opportunities for local innovation of civil EPILs. The law that clearly
establishes the standing and procedures for prosecutorial regulators is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of
prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs. The organizational cost
of regulation, which is concerned with the risk of losing litigation, the
cost of litigation and the risk of going against local government, has
the most bite. The cost of regulation has become a common factor that
significantly influences the regulatory motivation of prosecutorial
organs and shapes their regulatory behaviours in filing civil EPILs
throughout the three stages. For instance, it is observed that
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prosecutorial organs prefer civil litigations incidental to criminal
litigation, and prefer to file cases with less complicated facts, weak and
small defendants, and minor environmental violations. They also
prefer the administrative EPIL work (in particular, pre-trial resolution
of administrative EPILs) rather than the civil EPIL work.
Table 5. Characteristics of Prosecutorial Regulation in the Three Stages

This study argues that a short-run top-down approach has very
limited effectiveness, which seems a common problem of regulation
in China. It also provides evidence that the perceived cost of regulation
by regulators is the Achilles’ heel of regulation in authoritarian China.
To address notoriously weak environmental law enforcement at the
local level, the central authority often sets “high-priority, quantitative
environmental targets” to mobilize its massive bureaucracy. 136 The
outcome, however, is often poor because of weak regulatory capacity
and lack of autonomy and accountability. 137 This state of affairs is
reflected in the well-known idiom that “the central has measures, and
the local has counter-measures (shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice 上有
政策,下有对策)”.138 Similar problems have occurred in food safety
regulation. The widely used top-down regulatory campaigns,
according to Liu, “reflects Beijing’s institutional weakness in
stabilizing its regulatory capacity”.139 In fact, the top-down approach
takes no account of the perceived cost of regulation by regulators
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associated with the organizational appraisal system, regulatory
capacity and regulatory autonomy.
This study also highlights the conditions needed for successful
prosecutorial regulation: low cost of regulation and a well-developed
legal system. In Brazil, although the Ministério Público (the Public
Prosecution Office, “MP”) had originally been dedicated primarily to
criminal prosecution, civil litigation on behalf of environmental
interests became “an equally important part of its work”.140 Based on
the existing studies, the success of prosecutorial enforcement in Brazil
mainly resulted from two conditions. First, the Brazilian Constitution
of 1988 grants the MP strong “administrative and functional
autonomy”,141 including high independence from other branches of the
government and the other three judicial branches, budget guarantees
and autonomy, and strong personal tenure for prosecutors. 142 This
allows them to act free of undue influence from local government. In
addition, “e[E]ach prosecutor independently chooses how to conduct
the investigations and lawsuits in his or her jurisdiction without fear of
dismissal, demotion, or involuntary transfer to another jurisdiction”.143
All these reforms were taking place when Brazil began to transform
into a democracy after a military dictatorship, and thus leaders of the
MP had the opportunity to lobby for the institution’s independence and
civil litigation powers.144 Second, the MP went through a process of
capacity building in terms of recruitment and specialization. The
mindset of prosecutors was also changed and they began to perceive
“the institution’s civil work to be more dynamic and important than its
criminal work”.145 As a result, the number of public civil actions filed
each year by the MP rose to almost 10 percent of the number of
administrative fines issued each year throughout the 1990s, 146
compared with only 0.55 percent in China.147
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Despite some criticisms of excessive discretion and limited
accountability,148 the Brazilian experience shows that autonomy and
capacity are critical to effective prosecutorial environmental
regulation. China’s experiences have confirmed this. In particular, the
lack of regulatory autonomy on the part of the Chinese prosecutorial
organs has significantly increased the costs of regulation and thus
undermined the effectiveness of prosecutorial regulation in the
environmental regulatory landscape. Moreover, associated with the
limited regulatory capacity, the existing winning rate-oriented
performance appraisal mechanism further discourages prosecutorial
organs from filing important but controversial civil EPIL cases. These
factors have combined to frustrate the establishment of a culture and
practice of active and effective prosecutorial regulation that safeguards
environmental interests. As Mueller found from Brazil’s prosecutorial
enforcement, “when the costs to the regulator are high, the equilibrium
level of compliance will be low”, and “these costs can include not only
the administrative and logistic cost but also the political costs of
contradicting the interests of those in power or those it relies on for
support”.149
McAllister argues that prosecutors in “civil law countries
tended to play a larger role in protecting the public interests in private
civil litigation than the attorney general in common law countries”.150
In order to promote prosecutorial regulation in China, the autonomy of
prosecutorial organs must be enhanced. The government should
further implement institutional reform within the procuratorate system
with the aim of centralizing the management of personnel, financial
and material resources of local procuratorates below the provincial
level.151 Capacity building, of course, is an equally significant means
of improving prosecutorial regulation. The SPP needs to reform the
current winning rate-oriented performance appraisal criteria in order
to motivate prosecutorial regulation through public interest litigations.
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In addition, despite the established standing and procedures for
prosecutor-led EPILs, the proper rules regarding environmental
damage authentication, cooperation with EPBs with respect to case
information and evidence collection and effective judgment
enforcement, the management and supervision of the use of awarded
monetary remedies in civil EPILs should be further developed in China.
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